Washington is trying to reestablish its Afghan military base as a stronghold against Beijing and a local operations anchor
In August 2021, the Taliban swept into Kabul with astonishing speed, sending the US-backed government into exile and closing the chapter on America’s 20-year occupation. For Afghans, that moment ended a brutal period of drone strikes, corruption, and endless promises of “nation-building” that never materialized. But for Washington, especially for Donald Trump, Afghanistan remains unfinished business.
At the center of Washington’s renewed obsession is Bagram Air Base – once the nerve center of US operations. From there, America once projected power across Central and South Asia, while its prison complex became infamous for torture and indefinite detention.
For Afghans, Bagram symbolizes humiliation and abuse. For Trump, it represents something very different: a strategic outpost against China, a pressure tool against Kabul, and a potential gateway to Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves.
Trump has already demanded that the Taliban hand Bagram back to Washington. Kabul rejected the idea outright, but Trump has responded with veiled threats, warning of “consequences” if the Taliban continue to resist. This language is telling: even after military defeat, Washington sees Afghanistan not as a sovereign nation, but as a pawn on its geopolitical chessboard.
Trump’s renewed interest in Bagram is not really about Afghanistan. It is about China. The airfield sits a short flight from Xinjiang, home to China’s sensitive nuclear facilities. From Washington’s perspective, regaining Bagram would give the US a military foothold on China’s western flank – a convenient tool for surveillance, intimidation, and leverage.
This is why Trump has been so vocal about Beijing’s growing influence in Afghanistan. Since 2021, China has quietly but steadily expanded engagement with the Taliban, while the US sulked on the sidelines. By reestablishing a base, Washington hopes to both contain Beijing and reinsert itself into regional affairs it once dominated.
But such a move would not only destabilize Afghanistan; it would drag the region back into great-power confrontation, undermining reconstruction and poisoning Kabul’s fragile diplomatic standing. However, the political environment of 2025 is far removed from that of 2001. Unlike two decades ago, regional states – particularly China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan – are unwilling to accept renewed Western military installations in their neighborhood.
China’s stance on Trump’s Bagram plan is unambiguous. Beijing has repeatedly warned against any renewed foreign military presence in Afghanistan, stressing that such moves would destabilize the region. Chinese officials have underscored the principle of Afghan sovereignty, framing America’s return as a replay of failed policies that brought only war and poverty.
For Beijing, a US re-militarization of Afghanistan would carry direct security consequences. It would restore American strategic reach on China’s western approaches, complicating Beijing’s relationship with the Taliban and potentially spurring a new arms race in Central Asia. More broadly, it would entangle Afghanistan once again in great-power rivalry, erasing progress made since 2021 in normalizing its role as a neutral partner for trade and development.
China prefers a very different future: Afghanistan as a neutral economic partner, a link in regional trade routes, and a buffer against extremism.
China moved early, even before the American withdrawal, by hosting Taliban leaders in Tianjin in July 2021. After the Taliban took power, Beijing restored diplomatic contact quickly and signaled its readiness to cooperate. In March 2022, foreign minister Wang Yi visited Kabul – the most senior official from any major country to do so. By September 2023, China appointed its ambassador to Afghanistan, becoming the first country to post a full envoy under Taliban rule.
This careful, pragmatic approach amounts to de facto recognition without formal endorsement. Beijing engages whoever governs Kabul, not out of ideology, but out of realism: Afghanistan’s stability is too important to ignore. At the same time, China avoids the political risks of full recognition, maintaining flexibility as it pushes for a regional consensus.
At the top of Beijing’s agenda is security. For China, Afghanistan must never again become a haven for the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or other militant groups capable of stoking unrest in Xinjiang. The Taliban’s past links with ETIM fuel Chinese caution, and Beijing demands credible counter-terror guarantees.
Border stability is equally critical. The narrow Wakhan corridor connects Afghanistan directly to Xinjiang, and Beijing fears uncontrolled flows of refugees, drugs, or militants, and views close cooperation with the Taliban as essential to containing those risks.
China’s economic interests in Afghanistan are also considerable. The country possesses immense mineral wealth – copper, lithium, rare earths – much of it untouched. Chinese firms have already secured stakes in projects such as the Mes Aynak copper mine, considered one of the world’s largest, with inauguration projected for 2026.
Trade is expanding rapidly. In 2023, bilateral trade jumped 125 percent. Afghan products now enjoy duty-free access to the Chinese market, while Chinese companies invest in oil extraction and industrial zones. A landmark deal was the $540 million contract signed in January 2023 to extract oil from the Amu Darya basin.
Connectivity projects also attract Beijing. Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of Central and South Asia, linking China to Pakistan, Iran, and beyond. The idea of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan reflects Beijing’s ambition to integrate the country into a wider Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework.
Politically, Beijing’s approach emphasizes regional mechanisms over unilateral dominance. It has pursued trilateral dialogue with Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2017, focusing on connectivity and counter-terrorism. More recently, these talks have revived discussions about extending CPEC and coordinating against external interference.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also provides a platform for Afghanistan’s gradual integration into regional security and development structures. Though membership is not imminent, China views the SCO as a natural forum for managing Afghan issues collectively. By anchoring Afghanistan in regional institutions, Beijing aims to dilute the influence of extra-regional powers and stabilize its neighborhood.
The divergence between US and Chinese approaches could not be clearer. Washington and its Western allies froze over $9 billion in Afghan reserves, depriving Kabul of funds desperately needed for reconstruction. Western sanctions isolate the Afghan banking sector and hinder ordinary Afghans’ livelihoods. Beijing, in contrast, has expanded trade, signed investment deals, and publicly lobbied for unfreezing assets.
For Afghans, the comparison is tangible. One power departed in chaos, leaving economic collapse and sanctions. The other moved in with pragmatic offers of cooperation, however limited. While Beijing is not offering charity, its proposals align with Kabul’s own desire for sovereignty and development.
Trump’s threats over Bagram reveal a deeper truth about Washington’s mindset. Even in defeat, America cannot accept that Afghanistan is no longer under its control. For the US, the country remains nothing more than a strategic outpost in its rivalry with China.
But the landscape has changed. Afghanistan has other options, and Beijing has positioned itself as a pragmatic partner, offering investment and regional cooperation instead of bombs and bases.
By threatening Afghanistan while opposing China’s influence, Washington risks reigniting the very instability it once claimed to resolve. For Beijing, the logic is simpler: prosperity and sovereignty are the best antidotes to extremism. For the Afghans themselves, the lesson of the last two decades is unmistakable: a foreign military presence brings occupation, not stability.
China supports Kabul in resisting external interference and strengthening genuine sovereignty. After two decades of foreign occupation and the failed “export of democracy,” Afghans know the heavy cost of outside agendas. That painful experience explains why Beijing’s pragmatic approach – grounded in respect, development, and stability – is gaining traction not only in Afghanistan but across the wider region.
