Washington’s warships guard the chokepoints. Beijing digs for exits on land. The clash is just beginning.
The rivalry between China and the United States has become the defining axis of global geopolitics, and nowhere is it sharper than in the Indo-Pacific. Washington, guided by the doctrines of naval strategists Alfred Mahan and Nicholas Spykman, has long pursued a “thalassocratic” strategy: controlling the seas and coastlines of Eurasia to prevent any continental power from pushing outward and threatening American trade.
For Beijing, the challenge is existential. A nation of 1.4 billion people depends on secure flows of energy and commerce. China’s leaders know their country’s vulnerability – heavy reliance on maritime and land corridors that could be choked off in a crisis. To guard against this, Beijing has spent the past decade developing an ambitious strategy: diversifying its supply routes and building influence through vast infrastructure projects.
Back in November 2003, then-President Hu Jintao warned that “certain major powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the [Malacca] Strait.” More than two decades later, his words still capture Beijing’s deepest strategic anxiety.
The Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints. Stretching 805km between the Malaysian Peninsula, Singapore, and Indonesia’s Sumatra, it narrows to just 2.8km at its tightest point.
Each year, over 60,000 ships pass through, carrying nearly a quarter of global maritime trade, according to the International Maritime Organization. In 2023 alone, the strait handled about 24 million barrels per day of crude oil and liquefied natural gas, much of it bound for China – the world’s largest energy importer, according to Rystad Energy.
This makes Malacca both indispensable and dangerously vulnerable. According to the US Energy Information Administration, China still brings in about 73% of its crude oil and 40% of its LNG through this single corridor. The sheer concentration of flows exposes Beijing to multiple risks at once: a naval blockade in a conflict, piracy, political leverage from coastal states, or American pressure backed by a heavy US military presence in the region. Washington frames this as a mission to “guarantee freedom of navigation” – but Beijing sees it as a chokehold on its lifeline.
Beijing’s answer to the Malacca dilemma has been sweeping in scope: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Launched in 2013, it now stretches across more than 150 countries, backed by massive investment flows.
In the first half of 2025 alone, Chinese contracts and deals surged to a record $124 billion, according to the Green Finance & Development Center. Of this, $66.2 billion went into infrastructure projects – ports, pipelines, highways – while another $57.1 billion supported investments across energy, technology, and manufacturing.
Energy has been the centerpiece. More than $42 billion was committed in 2025, most of it for oil and gas, but with a growing share devoted to renewables. Nearly $10 billion went into wind and solar projects, pushing installed capacity close to 12 gigawatts.
This reflects Beijing’s dual aim: securing reliable supplies of fossil fuels while cautiously broadening into green alternatives. The guiding principle is simple – diversification.
China’s leaders present this effort not as a zero-sum challenge, but as a cooperative vision. At the Annual Meeting of New Champions in 2025, Premier Li Qiang framed it this way: “We Chinese people often say that harmony makes good business. We have economic and trade exchanges with almost all countries and regions of the world. We treat all partners as equals, regardless of any differences in size, system, or culture, and we work with them to manage disagreements and expand consensus through dialogue and consultation in line with WTO principles.”
Behind the rhetoric lies a clear strategic logic: build alternative routes, reduce exposure to chokepoints, and create long-term leverage through infrastructure.
Professor Christoph Nedopil, a leading analyst of China’s global finance, sees 2025 as a turning point:
“China’s record BRI engagement in 2025 reflects a renewed push into critical sectors such as energy, mining and high-tech manufacturing. What we’re seeing is China leveraging its industrial strengths to secure future competitiveness and supply chain resilience in a shifting global economy.”
Breaking out through the continent
If the Strait of Malacca is China’s weak spot, South Asia offers the way around it. Long seen as India’s strategic backyard, the region is now being reshaped by Beijing’s advance. Through a mix of ports, pipelines, and corridors, China is laying down routes that could bypass both Malacca and American naval power.
But it comes with heavy risks. Pakistan has been plagued by violence targeting Chinese interests: in 2018, the Balochistan Liberation Army attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi; in 2021, a car bomb exploded at a hotel housing the Chinese ambassador in Quetta; shuttle buses carrying Chinese engineers and workers have been repeatedly targeted.
In 2024, terrorists even struck major infrastructure projects, from nuclear facilities to hydroelectric plants, forcing temporary shutdowns. Security remains CPEC’s Achilles’ heel – but Beijing shows no sign of retreat. Its energy lifeline depends on it.
Afghanistan: The “Saudi Arabia of lithium”
Afghanistan, too, has returned to China’s strategic map since the US withdrawal. The country holds immense mineral wealth – lithium, copper, rare earths – estimated at more than $1 trillion. A 2010 Pentagon memo even called Afghanistan “the Saudi Arabia of lithium.”
In 2025, China reopened its embassy in Kabul, signaling intent to anchor a long-term presence. The calculation is clear: secure access to critical minerals while gradually reintegrating Afghanistan into the regional economy. But the risks are equally clear: political volatility, security fragility, and a renewed “Great Game” involving Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.
Bangladesh: Quiet realignment
Bangladesh, historically closer to India, is drifting toward China under the weight of investment. Beijing has committed over $2.1 billion in loans, grants, and direct projects. Among them: $400 million pledged to modernize Mongla Port, the country’s second-busiest seaport; $350 million for a new China Industrial Economic Zone, where nearly 30 Chinese firms have promised around $1 billion in investments. Piece by piece, Dhaka’s economic map is being redrawn – and its political orientation may follow.
The fact is that countries across South Asia are calculating their economic interests with China, while remaining cautious about sovereignty in an increasingly unstable environment. As former Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan observed in his lecture ASEAN & US-China Competition in Southeast Asia:
“Borderlands and strategic sea-routes are always contested. US-China competition is only the most recent manifestation. The interests of major powers have always intersected in Southeast Asia, which was once dubbed the ‘Balkans of Asia.’”
China’s push into South Asia unfolds against a harsher backdrop: an escalating economic and technological confrontation with the United States. Despite headwinds, Beijing has set an official 2025 growth target of 5%.
Yet Washington has tightened the screws. The US has pursued aggressive tariffs on Chinese goods, while semiconductors and electric vehicles face strict regulatory barriers. The goal is explicit: curb China’s rise and protect American industry.
President Joe Biden underscored this in May 2024: “We’ll counter China’s overcapacity in these industries – steel and aluminum. And we’re making major investments in clean American steel and aluminum.”
China, for its part, has turned to diplomacy with a multipolar tone. At the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi pitched a new security framework:
The rhetoric contrasts sharply with Beijing’s actions. Political theorist John Mearsheimer has long argued that China’s rise follows a logic of “offensive realism” – a great power’s drive not only to survive, but to dominate its region and challenge the hegemon. That tension defines today’s struggle: Beijing frames its rise as inclusive and cooperative, while Washington – under a harder Trump-era line – treats it as a direct threat.
For America’s allies in Europe, pressure works. But in a more multipolar Global South, the message is harder to sell.
Breaking containment – or just testing the lines?
China has built more than blueprints. From Gwadar to Mongla, from pipelines through Myanmar to investments in Kabul, Beijing is laying down a lattice of routes meant to loosen America’s grip on its lifelines. The logic is simple: diversify, spread risk, and make any US attempt at a blockade less effective.
Yet each corridor comes with a price. Pakistan’s insecurity, Afghanistan’s volatility, Bangladesh’s balancing act, even the enormous costs of a Kra Canal – all highlight how fragile these alternatives remain. South Asia may be the hinge of China’s breakout strategy, but it is also a region where instability is the rule, not the exception.
For now, Washington still holds the advantage at sea. Its fleets and bases across the Indo-Pacific keep Malacca under watch, reminding Beijing that maritime power remains America’s strongest card. But on land, China is advancing step by step, building assets and leverage that could one day tilt the balance.
The contest between the American thalassocracy and China’s continental reach has only just begun. South Asia is no longer just India’s backyard – it is the new front line of great-power rivalry.
